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Abstract
Men’s and women’s preferences are intercorrelated to the extent that men rank
highly those women who rank them highly. Intercorrelation plays an important
but overlooked role in determining outcomes of matching mechanisms. We study
via simulation the effect of intercorrelated preferences on men’s and women’s ag-
gregate satisfaction with the outcome of the Gale-Shapley matching mechanism.
We conclude with an application of our results to the student admission matching
problem.
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1 Introduction.
In two-sided matching problems, the intercorrelation of preferences plays an important but
largely overlooked role in determining the outcomes of various matching mechanisms. Other
factors that also play important roles include correlated preferences, truncated preference lists
and strategic reporting of preferences. These better known factors are defined in terms of a
single side’s preferences, or, since we will concentrate on marriage matching, in terms of a
single gender’s preferences. In contrast, intercorrelation of preferences concerns the relationship
between men’s and women’s preferences: roughly speaking, men’s and women’s preferences are
intercorrelated to the extent that men rank highly those women who rank them highly.
Our main goal in this paper is a quantitative description of the effect of intercorrelation of
preferences on men’s and women’s aggregate satisfaction with the outcome of the Gale-Shapley
matching algorithm. We set this as our goal in the belief that, or rather with the knowledge
that, while there is a great deal to be learned about those complex two-sided matching problems
that arise in real-life applications, there is still much to be learned about two-sided matching by
studying the workings of the Gale-Shapley algorithm applied to the simplest marriage matching
problem.
We choose to use simulation in our study because theoretical progress is difficult in this
area due to the complex interaction of men’s and women’s preferences during a run of the men-
propose Gale-Shapley algorithm. Theoretical progress has been slow and known results involve
unrealistic and restrictive assumptions about preferences. For example, Wilson (1972) found a
useful upper bound for the expected sum of men’s rankings of their mates as assigned by the men-
propose Gale-Shapley algorithm when women’s preferences are arbitrary (unrealistic) and men’s
are random (unrealistic and restrictive). Knoblauch (2008) found a lower bound which, together
with Wilson’s upper bound, implies the expected sum of men’s rankings of their assigned mates
divided by the natural log of the number of men approaches 1 for large n. Using simulation, we
will be able to go beyond the assumptions of women’s preferences arbitrary and men’s random
and investigate more realistic cases in which men’s preferences are to various degrees correlated,
as are women’s, and men’s and women’s preferences are to various degrees intercorrelated.
Before outlining our plan of attack, we present three examples to show how positive and
negative intercorrelation of preferences arise.
Example 1. Positively Intercorrelated Preferences. Chen and So¨nmez (2006) study student
assignment in Boston, where law mandates that schools give preference to students who live
nearby and/or have siblings already enrolled. Presumably, students prefer nearby schools and
schools their siblings attend. The result is positive intercorrelation of preferences.
While student assignment in Boston is a many-to-one matching problem, it can be converted
to a one-to-one matching problem by representing each school as many individuals with identical
preferences (Teo, Sethuraman and Tan, 2001). This replication procedure maintains positive
intercorrelation of preferences while introducing some correlation, since replicants of the same
school have identical preferences.
Example 2. Positively Intercorrelated Preferences. Consider a world-wide pen-pal club that
matches children with opposite gender pen-pals. In this example, individuals will prefer not the
nearby matches as in Example 1, but the more exotic distant matches. The result will again be
positively intercorrelated preferences.
2
Example 3. Negatively Intercorrelated Preferences. After public universities have filled their
mandated in-state student quotas, there remains the problem of matching unfilled slots with
unmatched applicants. Due to higher out-of-state tuition, universities will tend to prefer out-
of-state applicants, while applicants will tend to prefer in-state universities. The result will be
negatively intercorrelated preferences.
We approach the question of the effect of intercorrelated preferences on the outcome of the
men-propose G-S algorithm as follows. First we develop a method for generating men’s and
women’s preferences with arbitrary levels of correlation and intercorrelation. Then we run the
men-propose G-S algorithm on many marriage matching problems that have been generated by
our method. Next we run regressions on aggregate satisfaction vs. intercorrelation of prefer-
ences. Of course we find as expected that aggregate satisfaction increases for both genders with
increasing intercorrelation of preferences, but we analyze our results more closely in order to
disentangle the effects of intercorrelation from those of correlation. We also develop a general
measure of intercorrelation; the measure used in the aforementioned analysis is only defined for
preferences generated by our method.
We should remark here that we are not trying to define the best or most natural measure of
intercorrelation. Rather we are looking for a measure of intercorrelation that works. In other
words, we want a measure of intercorrelation that allows us to demonstrate that, with just three
numbers, correlation of men’s lists and of women’s lists and intercorrelation, we can to some
extent predict the outcome of the complex interaction of men’s and women’s preferences that
occurs during a run of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Finally, we discuss the effect of intercorrelation on the number of women who would profit by
a shift from the men-propose to women-propose G-S algorithm, which is a proxy for the number
of stable matchings, and which in turn is a proxy for the susceptibility of a matching mechanism
to strategic reporting of preferences. For the sake of simplicity and clarity of presentation, we re-
strict our discussion to marriage matching with 100 men and 100 women, and almost exclusively
to the men-propose G-S algorithm. We also concentrate on aggregate gender satisfaction be-
cause the anticipated aggregate satisfaction with the outcome of a matching mechanism strongly
influences whether a gender will agree to the use of that mechanism.
Even before Gale and Shapley (1962) presented the world with their simple yet powerful
deferred acceptance algorithm, a similar centralized matching mechanism was already being
used in the market for medical interns. Though controversial at times (and undergoing some
adaptive transformations to keep up with market conditions), the National Residency Matching
Program (NRMP) has long stood as evidence that G-S matching mechanisms can in fact deliver
Pareto efficient outcomes in real world two-sided markets. The evolution of the NRMP, the
basic theoretical properties of the G-S algorithm, and many examples and extensions of two-
sided matching mechanisms are chronicled by Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
In a thorough account of the NRMP’s latest incarnation, Roth and Peranson (1999) acknowl-
edge the crucial role of preferences in determining market outcomes, and emphasize the need
for a more in depth design literature to aid future market engineering efforts. Motivated by
this call to action, we set out to study intercorrelation of preferences, which, immediately upon
its discovery, we had suspected of having a strong influence on matching outcomes. Real world
examples of beneficial economic design in two-sided matching environments are plentiful, most
notably in public education markets where intercorrelated preferences are undoubtedly present
due to location considerations (Teo et al., 2001; Chen and Sonmez, 2001;Abdulkad´ırog˘lu et al.,
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2005a and 2005b). Potential for improved matching also exists in employment markets such
as the market for law clerks (Haruvy et al. 2006), and in less traditional markets such as the
sorority rush market (Mongell and Roth, 1991).
All of the aforementioned examples and the corresponding literature underline the effective-
ness of theoretical and computational work in studying the rules that govern market interaction.
While G-S matching mechanisms undeniably provide Pareto efficient outcomes in two-sided
markets, results regarding satisfaction and strategic possibilities are crucial to elicit full partic-
ipation and truthful representation. Like Knoblauch and Celik’s work (2007) with correlated
preferences, our work with intercorrelated preferences quantifies the relationship between a key
aspect of preference structure and the satisfaction of each side of the market with the G-S out-
come. This requires as a key step disentangling the effects of correlation and intercorrelation. As
an additional contribution, our work also quantifies the relationship between preference struc-
ture and the potential for strategic manipulation. Previous work has shown that a single-valued
core is a necessity to truly strategy-proof matching mechanisms so that no individual can benefit
from misrepresentation (So¨nmez, 1999; Ehlers and Masso, 2005). We quantify the link between
a population’s preferences and the size of the stable set.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries. Section 3
introduces a method for generating intercorrelated preferences. Sections 4-7 discuss the effect of
intercorrelated preferences on the outcomes of matching mechanisms. Section 8 concludes.
2 Preliminaries.
The simplest marriage matching problem starts with a set M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} of men and a
set W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} of women. Each man ranks the women 1st through nth via a 1-1 onto
function rmi : W → {1, 2, . . . , n}, where mi prefers wj to wk if rmi(wj) < rmi(wk). Similarly,
each woman ranks the men. The most basic problem is to find a stable matching ; that is a 1-1
onto function µ: M →W such that there is no man and woman each of whom prefers the other
to his or her match assigned by µ.
The men-propose G-S algorithm produces a stable matching in finitely many rounds as fol-
lows: In each round each man who is not currently engaged proposes to his preferred woman
among those who have not yet rejected him. Then each women who has been proposed to in
this round tentatively accepts her preferred man among her current fiance´e if she has one and
those who have just proposed to her. The process ends when, at the end of a round, all women
are engaged. Then all engagements become marriages.
The m-p G-S algorithm is men optimal and women worst in that for any preference profile
pair there is no stable matching that provides any man with a more desired mate or any woman
with a less desired mate.
3 Generating Intercorrelated Preferences.
Our method for generating men’s and women’s preferences with arbitrary levels of correlation
and intercorrelation proceeds in two steps. In step one man mi ∈ M assigns a score Xi,j to
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woman wj ∈W according to equation (1), which will be explained momentarily.
Xi,j = ηi,j + UMIj + VM |i− j|100 (1)
In step 2 each manmi ranks the women first through last with rmi(wj) < rmi(wk) if Xi,j < Xi,k.
Then each woman wj forms preferences over the men in a similar manner.
The first two terms on the right side of equation (1) follow the method of Caldarelli and
Capocci (2001) for generating correlated preferences. Each of ηi,j and Ij are randomly chosen
from [0, 1]; ηi,j represents the personal dimension ofmi’s opinion of wj ; Ij represents the common
opinion of wj by all the men; UM is arbitrarily chosen from [0,+∞) and provides a simple
measure of the level of correlation of men’s preferences, since increasing UM tends to make the
men’s preferences more alike; |i − j|100 = min{|i − j|, 100 − |i − j|}/50 can be interpreted as
the distance from mi to wj if for each i mi and wi are placed at hour i on a 100-hour clock
with circumference 2; and VM is chosen arbitrarily from (−∞,+∞). For large positive VM ,
men tend to prefer closer women as in Example 1 of Section 1, while for large negative VM ,
men tend to prefer distant women, as in Example 2. Therefore, for VW replacing VM when
women’s preferences are formed using equation (1) with suitable alterations, VM × VW provides
a simple measure of intercorrelation–when VM and VW have the same sign, preferences tend to
be positively intercorrelated as in Examples 1 and 2, and when VM and VW have opposite signs,
preferences tend to be negatively intercorrelated as in Example 3.
We end this section with a caveat. Correlation and intercorrelation are strongly intertwined,
so that there is no hope that VM × VW is a perfect measure of intercorrelation. For example, if
UM is much larger than VM and VW , then men’s preferences will almost certainly be perfectly
correlated, that is, identical. When men’s preferences are identical, there will in fact be no
intercorrelation regardless of the size of VM × VW .
4 Gender Satisfaction and Intercorrelation of Preferences.
In order to make a preliminary examination of the effect of intercorrelation of preferences on the
levels of men’s and women’s satisfaction with the outcome of the men-propose G-S algorithm,
we fixed n = 100 and formed the 320 ordered 4-tuples (UM , UW , VM , VW ) with UM = UW ∈
{0, .5, 1, 2, 3} and VM , VW ∈ {−3,−2,−1,−.5, .5, 1, 2, 3}. For each of the ordered 4-tuples, for
100 trials we generated men’s and women’s preferences as described in Section 3 and ran the
men-propose G-S algorithm. Figure 1 displays the results with VM × VW on the horizontal axis
andMS, the sum of men’s rankings of their assigned mates (averaged over trials), on the vertical
axis. Keep in mind when examining the figures that higher MS means lower men’s satisfaction,
since an individual man is less satisfied when matched with his 17th ranked woman, for example,
then when matched with his 12th ranked woman. In Figure 1 we see that this first step in the
analysis has done little to clarify the relationship between intercorrelation of preferences and
men’s aggregate satisfaction.
Figure 2 displays the results with VM × VW on the horizontal axis and WS, the sum of
women’s rankings of their assigned mates, on the vertical axis. Here as expected satisfaction
increases, that is WS decreases, with increasing intercorrelation, as measured by VM × VW . We
also ran a regression of women’s satisfaction against intercorrelation:
WS = β0 + β1UM + β2UW + β3 exp(− exp(−β4(VM × VW − β5))) (2)
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Figure 1: Men’s Satisfaction vs. Vm × Vw
Figure 2: Women’s Satisfaction vs. Vm × Vw
Here the Gompertz function was chosen because a sigmoid function takes on the S shape that
we expect of the data; we expect WS to increase with positive intercorrelation and to decrease
with negative intercorrelation, and we know that WS is bounded below (by n) and above (by
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Figure 3: Women’s Satisfaction vs. Vm × Vw, Separated by Correlation
n2). The corresponding estimation curve appears in Figure 2. The coefficients β1 and β2 are
omitted in our figures because they are seldom significant. All of the coefficients presented are
significant at the five percent level or better.
Two observations will guide us in refining our analysis. First, the scattering in Figures 1
and 2, that is, the vertical spread of the data on each vertical line containing data points, is in
large part due to the fact that each such line contains points with correlations UM and UW that
range from 0 to 3. We know from Celik and Knoblauch (2007) that correlation affects gender
satisfaction.
Second, we had greater success with women than with men in the first step of our analysis,
because there is a third factor that affects men’s satisfaction. That third factor is VM . To see
why VM is a greater factor in determining men’s satisfaction than VW is in determining women’s
satisfaction, consider the extreme case where VM is so great in absolute value that no two men
rank the same woman first. Since men propose, each man is matched with his first choice. In
this extreme case men’s satisfaction is entirely determined by VM , while women’s satisfaction
depends on VM × VW .
5 Isolating Intercorrelation.
In order to disentangle the effects of intercorrelation and correlation, we formed the 64 ordered
4-tuples (UM , UW , VM , VW ) with UM = UW = 0 and VM , VW ∈ {−3,−2,−1,−.5, .5, 1, 2, 3}.
For each ordered 4-tuple, for 100 trials we generated men’s and women’s preferences as described
in Section 3 and ran the men-propose G-S algorithm.
We then ran regressions of women’s satisfaction against intercorrelation using equation (2).
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Figure 4: Men’s Satisfaction vs. Vm × Vw, Separated by Correlation
We repeated this procedure four more times with UM = UW = U taking on successive values .5,
1, 2 and 3. The results are illustrated in Figure 3. On the left hand side of the figure are graphs
of the data. It is clear that we have been successful in reducing the vertical scatter of the data,
especially for lower values of U . On the right side of Figure 3 are the estimation curves for the
five data sets on the left and a key that relates the curves to the data and supplies formulas for
the curves. We can see in Figure 3 that correlation also alters the impact of intercorrelation:
1. For women the effect of intercorrelation decreases with increasing correlation, as can be
deduced from the absolute variations of the curves in Figure 3.
2. For women the effective range of intercorrelation, that is, the range over which small changes
in intercorrelation affect satisfaction, increases with increasing correlation, as can be seen
from the curves.
Next we graphed the same data on the left side of Figure 4, but with MS on the vertical
axes. Although using the five values of U to separate the data into five graphs has provided
some reduction in scattering, it is clear that there must be some other factor besides correlation
and intercorrelation of preferences that plays an important role in determining aggregate men’s
satisfaction. Guided by our observation at the end of Section 4, we further partitioned the data
as follows: choosing the graph for U = 3 as an example, we enlarged that graph, placed it on
the right side of Figure 4, and labeled the data points according to whether |VM | = .5, 1, 2 or 3.
We conclude from Figure 4 that
1. correlation, intercorrelation and |VM |, which we will call localization of preferences, together
completely determine men’s aggregate satisfaction with the m-p G-S matching, at least
when preferences are generated using our method;
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from the left side of Figure 4 that
2. men’s satisfaction decreases with increasing correlation;
and from the right side of Figure 4 that
3. men’s satisfaction increases with increasing localization of preferences,
4. men’s satisfaction increases with increasing intercorrelation (this trend is difficult to see until
the data has been partitioned by both U and |VM |), and,
5. men’s sensitivity to intercorrelation increases as |VM | decreases. Since decreasing |VM | with
U held fixed tends to increase the true level of correlation, we can say men’s sensitivity to
intercorrelation increases as correlation increases. The opposite is true for women as we
can see from the right side of Figure 3.
6 A General Measure of Intercorrelation.
The usefulness of VM × VW as a measure of intercorrelation of preferences is limited by the fact
that VM and VW are only defined for preference profiles generated using the method of Section
3. We now define a measure of intercorrelation for any preference profile pair. First square the
difference between the rank mi gives wj and the rank wj gives mi and add over all women.
φmi =
n∑
j=1
(rmi(wj)− rwj (mi))2 (3)
Then sum across the men and divide by n.
φave =
∑n
i=1 φmi
n
(4)
Now normalize using the maximum possible φave score obtained when no two men agree on the
rank of any woman, and each man is ranked last by his first-ranked woman, second last by his
second ranked woman, third last by his third ranked woman, etc.
Φ =
∑n
k=1(n+ 1− 2k)2 − φave∑n
k=1(n+ 1− 2k)2
(5)
Then perfect positive intercorrelation yields Φ = 1 and perfect negative intercorrelation yields
Φ = 0.
The obvious question is, will Φ behave similarly to VM × VW as a determining factor of
gender satisfaction with the outcome of the m-p G-S algorithm despite the one major difference
between VM × VW and Φ? That difference is that Φ measures intercorrelation after preferences
are formed, while VM×VW measures expected intercorrelation without taking into account what
UM and UW are chosen. Then, for example, even if VM and VW are large, for sufficiently large
UM men’s preferences will almost certainly be identical, so that Φ will almost certainly be 1/2.
To answer this question we repeated the work of the previous section, except that we used Φ
as a measure of intercorrelation rather than VM×VW . Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 2, we see
that Φ does a markedly better job of predictingWS than does VM×VW . In Figure 6 we see that
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Figure 5: Women’s Satisfaction vs. Φ
Figure 6: Women’s Satisfaction vs. Φ, Separated by Correlation
the two observations in Section 5 concerning women do not hold up or are much less pronounced
than indicated in Figure 3. Also in Figure 6 it can be seen that there is an asymmetric aspect
to the impact of intercorrelation. Negative intercorrelation has a gradual effect on WS, but as
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Figure 7: Size of Stable Set vs. Φ, Separated by Correlation
soon as intercorrelation is positive, the estimation curves level off quickly. We attribute these
differences to the fact Φ is a measure of intercorrelation, while VM×VW is a measure of expected
intercorrelation that does not take into account the suppression of intercorrelation by high values
of U .
On the other hand Φ and VM × VW are very similar as predictors of aggregate men’s satis-
faction, and the five observations in Section 5 that concern men hold up under analysis via Φ.
There is no reason to include the graphs that we compared with Figures 1 and 4 to reach these
conclusions.
7 Strategic Reporting of Preferences.
In this section we investigate the effect of intercorrelated preferences on the susceptibility of the
m-p G-S algorithm to strategic reporting of preferences. We follow Roth and Peranson (1999) in
using the number of women who would match with a different partner if the women propose G-S
algorithm replaced the m-p G-S algorithm as a proxy for susceptibility of the m-p G-S algorithm
to strategic reporting of preferences. We refer to our proxy as SS for short, where SS stands for
the size of the stable set.
The result of generating preferences and then matching via the m-p G-S algorithm is pre-
sented in Figure 7. We see that susceptibility to strategic reporting of preferences decreases
with increasing intercorrelation, and, for positively intercorrelated preferences, decreases with
increasing correlation.
Comparing Figure 6 and 7, we see that as was the case with aggregate women’s satisfaction,
intercorrelation and correlation together are good predictors of susceptibility to strategic report-
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ing of preferences; and strategic reporting of preferences is even more sensitive to intercorrelation
than is women’s satisfaction, and this sensitivity occurs over a shorter interval of intercorrelation.
8 Concluding Remarks.
We have shown that correlation and intercorrelation of preferences and localization of proposers’
preferences are the major determining factors of aggregate proposers’ and proposees’ satisfaction
with the Gale-Shapley outcome.
We illustrate some of our findings by applying them in a discussion of the effects of legally
mandated school preference for applicants who live nearby and/or have siblings already enrolled
on the outcome of the student-propose Gale-Shapley admissions matching. As we mentioned in
Example 1, such legal mandates introduce positive intercorrelation.
From our observations in Sections 4, 5 (observation 4) and 7, introduction of legal mandates
will increase aggregate school and aggregate student satisfaction, and will decrease susceptibility
to strategic reporting of preferences. By Section 5 observation 5, and the right side of Figure 4,
the magnitude of the positive effect of the legal mandate on student satisfaction is dependent
on correlation of preferences, localization of student preferences and degree of intercorrelation
before and after legal mandates go into effect.
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